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ABSTRACT
The central puzzle in international business cycles is that ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates are
volatile and persistent. We quantify the popular story for real exchange rate ﬂuctuations: they are
generated by monetary shocks interacting with sticky goods prices. If prices are held ﬁxed for at
least one year, risk aversion is high, and preferences are separable in leisure, then real exchange
rates generated by the model are as volatile as in the data and quite persistent, but less so than in
the data. The main discrepancy between the model and the data, the consumption—real exchange
rate anomaly, is that the model generates a high correlation between real exchange rates and the
ratio of consumption across countries, while the data show no clear pattern between these variables.
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Price Models of International Business Cycles.” A technical appendix, computer codes, and the data used in
this paper are available at http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr277.html. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
thank the National Science Foundation for support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The central puzzle in international business cycles is that ﬂuctuations in real exchange
rates are volatile and persistent. Since the work of Dornbusch (1976), the most popular
story to explain exchange rate ﬂuctuations is that they result from the interaction of mon-
etary shocks and sticky prices. So far, however, few researchers have attempted to develop
quantitative general equilibrium models of this story. Here, we do that, with some success.
In our general equilibrium monetary model with sticky prices, if risk aversion is high
and preferences are separable in leisure, then the model can account for the volatility of
real exchange rates. With price-stickiness of at least one year, the model also produces real
exchange rates that are quite persistent, but less so than in the data. If monetary shocks are
correlated across countries, then the model’s comovements in aggregates across countries are
broadly consistent with those in the data. The main discrepancy between the model and the
data is that the model generates a high correlation between real exchange rates and the ratio
of consumption across countries (relative consumption), while the data show no clear pattern
of correlation between these variables.
In constructing our model, we need to choose the source of real exchange rate ﬂuctu-
ations: deviations from the law of one price for traded goods across countries or ﬂuctuations
in the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods across countries or both. We choose to
abstract from nontraded goods and focus on ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates arising solely
from deviations from the law of one price for traded goods. This focus is guided by the data.
We present evidence that ﬂuctuations in the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods
across countries account for essentially none of the volatility of real exchange rates. Using
data for the United States and an aggregate of Europe (and our admittedly imperfect mea-
sures), we ﬁnd that only about 2% of the variance of real exchange rates is due to ﬂuctuations
in the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods. This evidence is consistent with studies
which document that even at a very disaggregated level, the relative price of traded goods
has large and persistent ﬂuctuations. (See, for example, the work of Engel (1993, 1999) and
Knetter (1993).)
Our two-country model is a version of Svensson and van Wijnbergen’s (1989) model
1modiﬁed to allow for several features that we expect will help the model produce patterns like
those in the data. We introduce price-discriminating monopolists in order to get ﬂuctuations
in real exchange rates from ﬂuctuations in the relative price of traded goods. (See the work
of Dornbusch (1987), Krugman (1987), Knetter (1989), Marston (1990), and Goldberg and
Knetter (1997).) We introduce sticky prices in order to get volatility and staggered price-
setting in order to get persistence in real exchange rates. We introduce capital accumulation
in order to generate the relative volatility of consumption and output observed in the data.
In our model, this relative volatility is closely connected to the volatility of the real exchange
rate relative to that of output.
In this benchmark model, the real exchange rate is the ratio of the marginal utilities
of consumption of households in the two countries. Since the utility function is separable
in leisure, the volatility of real exchange rates is essentially determined by the risk aversion
parameter and the volatility of consumption, while the persistence of real exchange rates is
essentially determined by the persistence of consumption. More precisely, we show that the
volatility of real exchange rates is approximately equal to the product of the risk aversion
parameter and the volatility of relative consumption in the two countries. We show that this
calculation implies that a risk aversion parameter of about 5 produces the real exchange rate
volatility in the data.
We also show that the persistence of real exchange rates is approximately equal to the
autocorrelation of relative consumption in the two countries. If prices are set for a substantial
length of time, then monetary shocks lead to persistent ﬂuctuations in consumption and,
hence, in real exchange rates. In our quantitative analysis, we assume that prices are set for
one year at a time along the lines of the evidence summarized by Taylor (1999). We ﬁnd
that with this amount of price-stickiness, real exchange rates are persistent in our model, but
somewhat less so than in the data. We refer to this discrepancy as the persistence anomaly.
To address the persistence anomaly, we replace the model’s frictionless labor markets
with sticky wages. The idea is that with sticky wages, nominal marginal costs respond less
to monetary shocks, so prices do too, thereby increasing persistence. While this avenue is
2conceptually promising, it does little to increase persistence.
Our benchmark model also displays a more troublesome anomaly. In the model, the
correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption is high and positive.
Yet for the United States and Europe, this correlation is somewhat negative while for other
country pairs it ranges between small and positive to somewhat negative. We refer to this
discrepancy between the model and the data as the consumption—real exchange rate anomaly.
In our model, the correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption
is high because the real exchange rate is proportional to the ratio of the marginal utilities
of consumption. This proportionality follows from our assumption that asset markets are
complete. We make this assumption because we want to isolate the role of a particular
type of goods market friction, namely, price-stickiness. Hence, we abstract from asset market
frictions. We emphasize that this proportional i t ybe t w e e nt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea n dm a r g i n a l
utilities holds in any model with complete asset markets, regardless of the frictions in the
goods and labor markets like sticky prices, sticky wages, shipping costs, and so on.
This anomaly leads us to consider two asset market frictions to try to weaken the link
between the real exchange rate and relative consumption. We begin by replacing the model’s
complete international asset markets with incomplete markets that allow for trade in only
an uncontingent nominal bond. This avenue is conceptually promising because it breaks the
link between real exchange rates and the marginal utilities of consumption. However, the
anomaly turns out to be as severe in the incomplete markets model as it is in the benchmark
model.
We then explore whether habit persistence in consumption can address this anomaly.
This speciﬁcation is appealing because habit persistence has been found to solve other anoma-
lies in asset markets. (See the work of Jermann (1998), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001).) However, we use some simple calculations to show
that adding habit persistence to the model is unlikely to eliminate the consumption—real
exchange rate anomaly.
Many researchers have investigated the economic eﬀects of sticky prices. For some
3early work in a closed-economy setting, see the studies by Svensson (1986), Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987), and Ball and Romer (1989). The international literature on sticky prices
has three branches. The pioneering work laying out the general theoretical framework is by
Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995). (See also the recent
work by Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille (2000).) More closely related to our paper
is the work of Betts and Devereux (2000) and Kollmann (2001), who consider economies
with price-discriminating monopolists who set prices, as in the work of Calvo (1983). Betts
and Devereux are primarily interested in replicating the vector autoregression evidence on
monetary policy shocks and exchange rates. Kollmann considers a semi-small open-economy
model in which both prices and wages are sticky; he shows that the model generates volatile
exchange rates. An early paper on the consumption—real exchange rate anomaly is that of
Backus and Smith (1993). They develop a model with nontraded goods in which there is a
close relation between relative consumption and real exchange rates and show there is little
evidence for this relation in the data. Finally, for some other work on the implications of
sticky prices for monetary policy under ﬁxed exchange rates, see the work of Ohanian and
Stockman (1997).
1. DATA
Here we document properties of measures of bilateral exchange rates between the United
States and individual European countries and a European aggregate. The series are con-
structed from data for individual countries collected by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (For de-
tails on our data series, see the ﬁles accompanying Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan (2001).) Our
data are quarterly and cover the period from 1973:1 through 2000:1. We show that the data
clearly support the notion that real exchange rates between the United States and Europe
are volatile and persistent. We then demonstrate, using disaggregated price data, that very
little–about 2%–of the volatility in real exchange rates arises from ﬂuctuations in the rel-
4ative prices of nontraded to traded goods across countries. This observation motivates our
decision to exclude nontraded goods from the model.
A. Volatility and persistence of exchange rates
Our measure of the nominal exchange rate et between the United States and Europe is a
trade-weighted average of the bilateral nominal exchange rates between the United States
and individual European countries.1 We construct a price index for all consumer goods in
the European countries, denoted P ∗
t , in an analogous way, using each country’s consumer
price index (CPI). The U.S. real exchange rate with Europe is denoted qt = etP ∗
t /Pt, where
Pt is the price index for the United States.
In Figure 1, we plot the quarterly U.S. nominal and real exchange rates with Europe
and the quarterly ratio of the CPI for Europe to that for the United States for the period 1973—
2000. Our aggregate of Europe consists of the 11 countries for which we could get complete
data: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Clearly, both the nominal and real exchange rates
are highly volatile, especially when compared to the relative price level. The exchange rates
are also highly persistent. (For an earlier analysis emphasizing these features of the data, see
the study by Mussa (1986).)
In Table 1, we present some statistics for exchange rates and CPIs for the United
States and the European aggregate and for the 11 individual European countries for the
period 1973:1—2000:1. (The data reported in the table are logged and Hodrick-Prescott (H-
P) ﬁltered.) The standard deviation of the real exchange rate between the United States
and Europe is 7.52.2 That is about 4.6 times the volatility of U.S. output over the same time
period (which has a standard deviation of only 1.64%). Clearly, real exchange rates are very
volatile.
We also see in Table 1 that the ratios of both nominal and real exchange rates between
the United States and Europe are highly persistent, with autocorrelations of .85 and .83,
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a n dn o m i n a la n dr e a le x c h a n g er a t e sa r ev e r yh i g h l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t he a c ho t h e r ,
5with a cross-correlation of .99. These patterns are also evident in bilateral comparisons
b e t w e e ne a c hE u r o p e a nc o u n t r ya n dt h eU n i t e dS t a t e s .
B. Decomposing real exchange rate ﬂuctuations
Theoretically, movements in real exchange rates can arise from two sources:3 deviations from
the law of one price for traded goods across countries and movements in the relative prices of
nontraded to traded goods across countries. To investigate the relative magnitudes of these
sources in the data, deﬁne the traded goods real exchange rate as qT = eP ∗
T/PT,w h e r ePT
and P ∗
T are traded goods price indices in the two countries. Let p = q/qT,w h e r eq is the
all-goods real exchange rate.
We refer to p as the nontraded goods relative price. To see why, suppose, as an
approximation, that the price indices in the two countries are given by P =( PT)1−α(PN)α
and P∗ =( P ∗
T)1−γ(P∗
N)γ, where PN and P∗
N are nontraded goods price indices, and α and γ
are the consumption shares of nontraded goods. Then p is equal to (P∗
N/P∗
T)γ/(PN/PT)α,a n d
its value depends on the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods in the two countries.
Notice that if the law of one price holds, then qT is constant and all the variance in q is
attributable to the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods.
Here, we use several measures of disaggregated price data to construct this decompo-
sition. One measure uses disaggregated CPI data. The OECD reports price index data in
its Main Economic Indicators, where it disaggregates the consumer price index for all items
into indices for food, all goods less food, rent, and services less rent. We construct a price
index for traded goods as a weighted average of the price indices for food and for all goods
less food. Since data on expenditure shares among traded goods by country are not readily
available, we use U.S. weights obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor (1992) to con-
struct this price index for each country in Europe which has disaggregated price data. These
countries are France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. The period is 1973:1—1998:4. For
the European aggregate, we use the trade-weighting procedure described above.
Figure 2 plots quarterly values of the all-goods real exchange rate q, the traded goods
6real exchange rate qT, and the nontraded goods relative price p for the period 1973—98.
This ﬁgure shows that virtually none of the movement in the all-goods real exchange rate is
due to ﬂuctuations in the relative price of nontraded to traded goods across countries. The
variance of the real exchange rate can be decomposed as var(logq) = var(logqT)+v a r ( l o gp)
+2 c o v ( l o g qT,logp). In the data, the variance decomposition becomes 3.64 = 4.10 + .076
− .54. Since the covariance between the two components is negative, the maximum portion
of the variance of the real exchange rate attributable to variability in the nontraded goods
relative price is only about 2%. (More precisely, the portion is 2.09% = (.076/3.64) × 100%.)
C. Alternative decompositions
Table 2 gives some additional statistics on relative prices and nominal and real exchange
rates for individual European countries as well as for the aggregate. These are quarterly data
for the period 1973:1—1998:4. Here, although there is some heterogeneity in the individual
country statistics, the bilateral comparisons have the same basic patterns as the comparison
of aggregates. For our European aggregate, the correlation between the traded goods real
exchange rate and the all-goods real exchange rate is about 1. In other respects, the statistics
in this table are similar to those in Table 1.
These measures provide evidence that the relative price of traded goods varies a great
deal across countries. Since these measures are constructed from broad aggregates, the law of
one price may hold for each traded good, and the volatility of the traded goods real exchange
rate may arise from compositional eﬀects among traded goods. But we doubt that composi-
tion eﬀects account for much of the volatility of real exchange rates: European countries have
consumption baskets similar to that of the United States, and these consumption baskets do
not change much over time.
The OECD also reports nominal and real consumption expenditures for four categories:
durable goods, semi-durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. We used these data to
construct traded and nontraded goods price indices and got similar results. (For details, see
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998).)
7Our measures of the price of traded goods are clearly imperfect in another way, as well.
They measure the price paid by the ﬁnal user of the goods and, hence, incorporate the value
of intermediate nontraded services, such as distribution and retailing. Thus, if the value of
such nontraded services is volatile, we would expect the real exchange rate for traded goods
to be volatile even if the law of one price held for goods net of the value of the nontraded
services.
One way to measure the volatility induced by distribution and retailing services is
to examine wholesale price indices (WPIs). These data reﬂect prices received by producers
and thus do not include many distribution and retailing costs. These data do, however,
include the prices of exported goods and exclude the prices of imported goods; thus, they
are imperfect measures of the real exchange rate. We report in Table 3 relative prices and
exchange rates constructed using WPIs. The procedure we used to construct these indices is
the same as that for the measures in Tables 1 and 2. For the period 1973:1—2000:1, WPI data
are available for the nine countries listed in Table 3. For the European aggregate relative to
the United States, the standard deviation of the real exchange rate constructed using WPIs
is 7.30, very close to the 7.52 standard deviation found using CPIs (Table 1). The closeness of
these measures suggests that volatile distribution costs are unlikely to be a signiﬁcant source
of real exchange rate volatility.
2. THE WORLD ECONOMY
Now we develop a two-country model with inﬁnitely lived consumers that we will use to
confront the observations just documented on exchange rates in Europe and the United
States. In our model, competitive ﬁnal goods producers in each country purchase intermediate
goods from monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers. Each intermediate
goods producer can price-discriminate across countries and must set prices in the currency
of the local market. Once prices are set, each intermediate goods producer must satisfy the
forthcoming demand. The intermediate goods producers set prices in a staggered fashion.
8Speciﬁcally, consider a two-country world economy consisting of a home country and
a foreign country. Each country is populated by a large number of identical, inﬁnitely lived
consumers. In each period of time t, the economy experiences one of ﬁnitely many states,
or events, st.W ed e n o t eb yst =( s0,...,s t) the history of events up through period t.T h e
probability, as of period 0, of any particular history st is π(st). The initial realization s0 is
given.
In each period t, the commodities in this economy are labor, a consumption-capital
good, money, a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i ∈ [0,1] produced in the home
country, and a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i ∈ [0,1] produced in the foreign
country. In this economy, the intermediate goods are combined to form ﬁnal goods which are
country-speciﬁc. All trade between the countries is in intermediate goods that are produced
by monopolists who can charge diﬀerent prices in the two countries. We assume that all
intermediate goods producers have the exclusive right to sell their own goods in the two
countries. Thus, price diﬀerences in intermediate goods cannot be arbitraged away.
In terms of notation, goods produced in the home country are subscripted with an H,
while those produced in the foreign country are subscripted with an F. In the home country,
ﬁnal goods are produced from intermediate goods according to a production function that
combines features from the industrial organization literature (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) and



















where y(st)i st h eﬁnal goods produced and yH(i,st)a n dyF(i,st) are the intermediate goods
produced in the home and foreign countries, respectively. This speciﬁcation of technology
will allow our model to be consistent with three features of the data. The parameter θ
will determine the markup of price over marginal cost. The parameter ρ, along with θ, will
determine the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. And the parameters
a1 and a2, together with ρ and θ, will determine the ratio of imports to output.
Final goods producers in our economy behave competitively. In the home country, in
9each period t, producers choose inputs yH(i,st)f o ri ∈ [0,1] and yF(i,st)f o ri ∈ [0,1] and














subject to the production function (1), where P(st) is the price of the ﬁnal good in period
t, PH(i,st−1) is the price of the home intermediate good i in period t, and PF(i,st−1)i st h e
price of the foreign intermediate good i in period t. These prices are in units of the domestic
currency. The intermediate goods prices can, at most, depend on st−1 because producers set































































Thus, in equilibrium, the price of the ﬁnal good in period t does not depend on the period t
shock.
The technology for producing each intermediate good i is a standard constant returns








where k(i,st−1)a n dl(i,st) are the inputs of capital and labor, respectively, and yH(i,st)a n d
y∗
H(i,st) are the amounts of this intermediate good used in home and foreign production of
the ﬁnal good, respectively. The capital used in producing good i is augmented by investment












where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and where the adjustment cost function φ is convex
and satisﬁes φ(δ)=0a n dφ
0(δ)=0 .
Sticky prices are introduced by having intermediate goods producers who behave as
monopolistic competitors. They set prices for N periods in a staggered way. In particular,
in each period t, af r a c t i o n1 /N of the home country producers choose a home currency price
PH(i,st−1) for the home market and a foreign currency price P∗
H(i,st−1) for the foreign market
before the realization of the event st. These prices are set for N periods, so for this group
of intermediate goods producers, PH(i,st+τ−1)=PH(i,st−1)a n dP∗
H(i,st+τ−1)=P ∗
H(i,st−1)
for τ =0 , ..., N − 1. The intermediate goods producers are indexed so that those with
i ∈ [0,1/N] set new prices in 0, N,2 N,a n ds oo n ,w h i l et h o s ew i t hi ∈ [1/N, 2/N]s e tn e w
prices in 1, N +1 ,2 N + 1, and so on, for the N cohorts of intermediate goods producers.
Consider, for example, intermediate goods producers in a particular cohort, namely,
i ∈ [0,1/N]. Let Q(st) be the price of one unit of home currency in st in an abstract unit of
account, e(st) be the nominal exchange rate, and w(st) be the real wage. The intermediate
goods producers in a particular cohort choose prices PH(i,st−1),P∗
H(i,st−1), inputs of labor










subject to (5), (6), and the constraints that their supplies to the home and foreign markets
yH(i,st)a n dy∗
H(i,st) must equal the amount demanded by home and foreign ﬁnal goods
producers, yd
H(i,st) from (3) and its analogue. In addition, the constraints that prices are set
for N periods are PH(i,st−1)=PH(i,s−1) for t =0 , ...,N−1a n dPH(i,st−1)=PH(i,sN−1)
for t = N, ...,2N − 1 and so on, with similar constraints for P∗
H(i,st−1). The initial capital
stock k(i,s−1) is given and is the same for all producers in this cohort.




























where v(i,st) is the real unit cost which is equal to the wage rate divided by the marginal








1−ρ ¯ P ∗
H(st−1)
ρ−θ
(1−ρ)(θ−1)y∗(st). Here, Fl(i,st) denotes the derivative of the production
function with respect to l. We use similar notation throughout the paper.
In a symmetric steady state, the real unit costs are equal across ﬁrms. Hence, in this
steady state, these formulas reduce to PH(i)=eP∗
H(i)=Pv/θ, so that the law of one price
holds for each good and prices are set as a markup (1/θ)o v e rn o m i n a lc o s t sPv.Thus, in this
model, all deviations from the law of one price are due to shocks which keep the economy
out of the deterministic steady state.
In this economy, the markets for state-contingent money claims are complete. We
represent the asset structure by having complete, contingent, one-period nominal bonds de-
n o m i n a t e di nt h eh o m ec u r r e n c y .W el e tB(st,s t+1) denote the home consumers’ holdings of
such a bond purchased in period t and state st with payoﬀs contingent on some particular
state st+1 at t +1 . L e tB∗(st,s t+1) denote the foreign consumers’ holdings of this bond.
One unit of this bond pays one unit of the home currency in period t + 1 if the particular
state st+1 occurs and 0 otherwise. Let Q(st+1|st) denote the price of this bond in units of
the home currency in period t and state st. Clearly Q(st+1|st)=Q(st+1)/Q(st). (Including
bonds denominated in the foreign currency would be redundant.) For notational simplicity,
we assume that claims to the ownership of ﬁrms in each country are held by the residents of
that country and cannot be traded.
In each period t =0 ,1,. . . , consumers choose their period t allocations after the







and a borrowing constraint B(st+1) ≥− P(st)b, where c(st), l(st), and M(st) are consumption,
labor, and nominal money balances, respectively; st+1 =( st,s t+1); Π(st)i st h ep r o ﬁts of the
home country intermediate goods producers; and T(st) is transfers of home currency. The
positive constant b constrains the amount of real borrowing of the consumer. The initial
conditions M(s−1)a n dB(s0)a r eg i v e n .













subject to the consumer budget constraints. Here β is the discount factor. The ﬁrst-order






























Here Uc(st), Ul(st), and Um(st) are the derivatives of the utility function with respect to its
arguments, and π(st|st−1)=π(st)/π(st−1) is the conditional probability of st given st−1.
The problems of the ﬁnal goods producers, the intermediate goods producers, and the
consumers in the foreign country are analogous to these problems. Allocations and prices in
the foreign country are denoted with an asterisk.
Now let’s develop a relationship between the real exchange rate and the marginal
utilities of consumption of the consumers in the two countries, which is implied by arbitrage.






13where B∗(st) denotes the foreign consumer’s holdings of the home country bonds at st.T h e





































where the constant κ = e(s0)Uc(s0)P∗(s0)/U∗
c(s0)P(s0). We use this relationship between real
exchange rates and marginal rates of substitution to develop intuition for our quantitative
results.
The money supply processes in the home and foreign countries are given by M(st)=
µ(st)M(st−1)a n dM∗(st)=µ∗(st)M∗(st−1), where µ(st)a n dµ∗(st) are stochastic processes
and M(s−1)a n dM∗(s−1) are given. New money balances of the home currency are distributed
to consumers in the home country in a lump-sum fashion by having transfers satisfy T(st)=
M(st)−M(st−1). Likewise, transfers of foreign currency to foreign consumers satisfy T ∗(st)=
M∗(st) − M∗(st−1).
An equilibrium requires several market-clearing conditions. The resource constraint








and the labor market-clearing condition is l(st)=
R
l(i,st)di. Similar conditions hold for the
foreign country. The market-clearing condition for contingent bonds is B(st)+B∗(st)=0 .
An equilibrium for this economy is a collection of allocations for home consumers c(st),
l(st), M(st), B(st+1); allocations for foreign consumers c∗(st), l∗(st), M∗(st), B∗(st+1); allo-
cations and prices for home intermediate goods producers yH(i,st), y∗
H(i,st),l(i,st),x (i,st),
and PH(i,st−1), P∗
H(i,st−1) for i ∈ [0,1]; allocations and prices for foreign intermediate goods
14producers yF(i,st), y∗
F(i,st),l∗(i,st),x ∗(i,st), and PF(i,st−1), P∗
F(i,st−1) for i ∈ [0,1]; and
allocations for home and foreign ﬁnal goods producers y(st),y ∗(st), ﬁnal good prices P(st),
P∗(st), real wages w(st),w ∗(st), and bond prices Q(st+1|st) that satisfy the following ﬁve
conditions: (i) the consumer allocations solve the consumers’ problem; (ii) the prices of in-
termediate goods producers solve their maximization problem; (iii)t h eﬁnal goods producers’
allocations solve their problem; (iv) the market-clearing conditions hold; and (v)t h em o n e y
supply processes and transfers satisfy the speciﬁcations above.
We are interested in a stationary equilibrium and thus restrict the stochastic processes
for the growth rates of the money supplies to be Markovian. To make the economy stationary,
we deﬂate all nominal variables by the level of the relevant money supply. A stationary
equilibrium for this economy consists of stationary decision rules and pricing rules that are
functions of the state of the economy. The state of the economy when monopolists make their
pricing decisions (that is, before the event st is realized) must record the capital stocks for
a representative monopolist in each cohort in the two countries, the prices set by the other
N − 1 cohorts in the two countries, and the period t − 1m o n e t a r ys h o c k s .
The shocks from period t − 1 are needed because they help forecast the shocks in
period t. The current shocks are also included in the state of the economy when the rest of
the decisions are made (that is, after the event st is realized).
We compute the equilibrium using standard methods to obtain linear decision rules
(Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2001)). For the benchmark preferences with one-quarter
price-stickiness and N =2 , we checked the accuracy of the linear decision rules against
nonlinear decision rules obtained by the ﬁnite element method. (For an introduction to the
ﬁnite element method, see McGrattan (1996).)
3. PARAMETERIZATION
In this section, we describe how we choose functional forms and benchmark parameter values.
We report our choices in the top panel of Table 4. (In later sections, we do extensive sensitivity
15analyses of our model. We report the parameter values for the variations in the bottom panel
of the table.)



























and an intermediate goods production function of the form F(k,l)=kαl1−α. Notice that the
utility function is separable between a consumption-money aggregate and leisure.
Consider ﬁrst the preference parameters. The discount factor β is set to give an annual
real return to capital of 4%. The literature has a wide range of estimates for the curvature
parameter σ, which determines the level of risk aversion. We set σ to 5 and show later that
this value is critical for generating the right volatility in the real exchange rate. Balanced
growth considerations lead us to set γ = σ.4 We set ψ so that households devote one-quarter
of their time to market activities. With these choices for σ, γ, and ψ, the elasticity of labor
supply, with marginal utility held constant, is 1/2.
To obtain η and ω, we draw on the money demand literature. Our model can be
used to price a variety of assets, including a nominal bond which costs one dollar at st and
pays R(st) dollars in all states st+1. The ﬁrst-order condition for this asset can be written as
Um(st)=Uc(st)[R(st) − 1]/R(st). When we use our benchmark speciﬁcation of utility, the














which has the form of a standard money demand function with consumption and interest
rates. To obtain the interest elasticity η, we ran a quarterly regression from 1960 to 1995
(inclusive) in which we used M1 for money; the deﬂator of the gross domestic product (GDP)
for P; consumption of durables, nondurables, and services for c; and the three-month U.S.
Treasury bill rate for R. Our estimate of the interest elasticity is η = .39, and the implied
value for ω is .94.
16Consider next the ﬁnal goods technology parameters. In our model, the elasticity of
substitution between home goods and foreign goods is 1/(1−ρ). Studies have estimated quite
a range for this parameter. The most reliable studies seem to indicate that for the United
States the elasticity is between 1 and 2, and values in this range are generally used in empirical
trade models. (See, for example, the survey by Stern, Francis, and Schumacher (1976).)) We
follow the work of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) and use an elasticity of 1.5, so that
ρ =1 /3. To set a1 and a2, note that in a symmetric steady state, yH/yF =[ a1/a2]
1
1−ρ .
In U.S. data, imports from Europe are roughly 1.6% of GDP. This implies that yH/yF =
.984/.016. Together with our normalization, this gives the values of a1 and a2 reported for
the benchmark model in Table 4.
For the intermediate goods technology parameters, we set the capital share parameter
α =1 /3 and the depreciation rate δ = .021. The latter implies an annual depreciation rate
of 10%. These are typical estimates for U.S. data. Based on the work of Basu and Fernald
(1994, 1995), Basu (1996), and Basu and Kimball (1997), we choose θ = .9, which implies a
markup of 11% and an elasticity of demand of 10. We set N = 4, so that prices are set for
four quarters based on the empirical studies summarized by Taylor (1999).
We consider an adjustment function of the form φ(x/k)=b(x/k − δ)2/2. Notice that
with this speciﬁcation at the steady state, both the total and marginal costs of adjustment are
0. Uncertainty about the size of these adjustment costs is high. In all of our experiments, we
choose the parameter b so that the standard deviation of consumption relative to the standard
deviation of output is equal to that in the data. One measure of the adjustment costs is the
resources used up in adjusting capital relative to investment given by φ(x/k)/x. For our
benchmark economy, the average resource cost in adjusting capital is .19% of investment.
The details of the monetary rules followed in the United States and Europe are ex-
tensively debated. For the benchmark economy, we assume that all the monetary authorities
follow a simple rule, namely, that the growth rates of the money stocks for both areas follow
17a process of the form
logµt = ρµ logµt−1 + εµt
logµ∗





µ) is a normally distributed, mean-zero shock. (Notice that each period now has a
continuum of states. Our earlier analysis with a ﬁnite number of states extends immediately
to this case.) Each shock has a standard deviation of σµ, and the shocks have a positive cross-
correlation. The stochastic process for money in the foreign country is the same. We choose
ρµ = .68 from the data by running a regression of the form (17) on quarterly U.S. data for M1
from 1959:2 through 2001:1, obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
In our experiments, we choose the standard deviation of the shocks so that the volatility
of output is the same in the model as in the U.S. data. (For example, in the benchmark model
we choose the standard deviation of log µ to be 2.3% in order to produce a standard deviation
of output of 1.82%. In the data, the standard deviation of log µ is 1.15%.) We also choose
the cross-correlation of these shocks to produce a cross-correlation for output that is similar
to that in the data. We choose the standard deviation and the cross-correlation of these
shocks in this way because we want to investigate whether a model in which monetary shocks
account for the observed movements in outputs can also account for the observed movements
in exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables.
4. FINDINGS
We report on the H-P—ﬁltered statistics for the data, the benchmark economy, and some
variations on that economy in Tables 5 and 6. The statistics for the data are all computed
with the United States as the home country and the aggregate of Europe as the foreign
country for the period 1973:1—1994:4.5 In these tables, net exports are measured by bilateral
real net exports from the United States to Europe. Unless otherwise noted, all other variables
are from U.S. data.
18Overall, we ﬁnd that the benchmark model generates nominal and real exchange rates
that match the data qualitatively: they are volatile, persistent, and highly cross-correlated.
However, quantitatively, along some dimensions, the model does less well: while its volatility
of exchange rates is about right, it generates too little persistence in exchange rates, too high
a correlation between real exchange rates and relative consumption, too much volatility in
the price ratio and employment, and too little volatility in investment.
In Table 5, we see that in the benchmark model, compared to output, the nominal
exchange rate is 4.3 2t i m e sa sv a r i a b l ea n dt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei s4 . 2 7t i m e sa sv a r i a b l e .
These values are close to those in the data (4.67 and 4.36). The benchmark model also
produces substantial persistence (autocorrelations) of nominal and real exchange rates (.69
and .62), but this persistence is less than that in the data (.86 and .83). Because these
diﬀerences are substantial, we refer to them as the persistence anomaly. We will explore ways
to eliminate this anomaly in Section 6A.
The high volatility of real exchange rates comes from our choice of a high curvature
parameter σ, which corresponds to a choice of high risk aversion. To see the connection
between volatility and σ, log-linearize the expression for real exchange rates, (14), to obtain
ˆ q = A(ˆ c − ˆ c
∗)+B(ˆ m − ˆ m
∗)+D(ˆ l − ˆ l
∗), (18)
where a caret denotes the deviation from the steady state of the log of the variable and m,m∗










evaluated at the steady state. For preferences of the form (15), the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion A is approximately equal to the curvature parameter σ =5 ,Bis unimportant, and
D = 0. (The actual values are A =4 .96 and B = .04. Notice that A is only approximately





std(ˆ c − ˆ c∗)
std(ˆ y)
.
19In Figure 3 we graph the benchmark model’s volatility of real exchange rates against
the curvature parameter σ, where this volatility is measured as in Table 5. As we vary σ, we
alter the adjustment cost parameter b to keep roughly unchanged the standard deviation of
consumption relative to that of output.6 We see that a curvature parameter of about 5 is
needed to reproduce the data’s volatility of real exchange rates relative to output (4.36). Note
also in Figure 3 that as σ is varied, the autocorrelation of real exchange rates is essentially
unchanged.
In terms of the persistence of real exchange rates, for our preferences the autocorrela-
tion of real exchange rates can be written as
corr(ˆ q, ˆ q−1) ∼ = corr(ˆ c − ˆ c
∗,ˆ c−1 − ˆ c
∗
−1).
This expression suggests that the autocorrelation of real exchange rates is essentially deter-
mined by the autocorrelation of consumption. In Table 6, we see that the autocorrelation of
consumption is high in the model (.61), but not as high as in the data (.89), which mirrors
the feature (from Table 5) that the autocorrelation of real exchange rates is high in the model
but lower than that in the data.
Without substantial price-stickiness, neither consumption nor real exchange rates
would have much persistence. To see this, consider Figure 4 in which we graph the au-
tocorrelation of consumption, the autocorrelations of real and nominal exchange rates, and
the volatility of the price ratio relative to the volatility of output against the number of
periods that prices are held ﬁxed, N. Notice that the autocorrelations of consumption and
the real exchange rate match almost exactly. When N =1 , both of these autocorrelations
are negative; as N increases, so do the autocorrelations. Notice also that as the number of
periods of price-stickiness increases, the volatility of the price ratio relative to that of output
declines and the behavior of the real exchange rate comes to mirror that of the nominal
exchange rate.
Our model has a tight link between real exchange rates and the ratio of marginal
utilities given by (18). This link implies a high correlation between real exchange rates and
20relative consumption. In Table 6, we see that in the data this correlation is −.35 while in
the model it is 1. We refer to this large discrepancy as the consumption—real exchange rate
anomaly. We investigate this anomaly in Section 6B.
Consider now the rest of the statistics for the benchmark economy in Tables 5 and
6. In Table 5, we see that the price ratio is substantially more volatile in the model (3.00)
than in the data (.71) while real and nominal exchange rates are less correlated in the model
(.76) than in the data (.99). These diﬀerences occur because prices move to oﬀset nominal
exchange rate movements more in the model than in the data. In Table 6, we see that real
exchange rates and output are more correlated in the model than in the data (.51 vs. .08),
while real exchange rates and net exports are slightly negatively correlated in the model
(−.04) and slightly positively correlated in the data (.14).7
In Table 6, we see that investment is a little more than half as volatile in the model
as in the data (1.59 vs. 2.78), while employment is more than twice as volatile in the model
as in the data (1.51 vs. .67). Investment is less volatile in the model because when σ =5 ,
a relatively high adjustment cost parameter is needed to make consumption have the right
volatility. With that level of adjustment costs, investment is not very volatile. If a suﬃciently
low adjustment cost parameter were used, then investment would be as volatile as in the data,
but consumption would be signiﬁcantly less volatile. (For example, when the adjustment cost
parameter is set at a level to make investment have a volatility of about 2.78, as in the data,
the volatility of consumption is only .50 while in the data it is .83.)
Employment is more rather than less volatile than output in the model because almost
all of the movement in output comes from variations in the labor input. Speciﬁcally, note
that log-deviations in output can be written as ˆ y = αˆ k +( 1− α)ˆ l. Since investment is only
a small percentage of the capital stock, this stock moves only a small amount at business
cycle frequencies, and we roughly have that std(ˆ y) ∼ = (1 − α)std(ˆ l). With α =1 /3, this gives
std(ˆ l)/std(ˆ y) ∼ = 1.5. So, in a sticky price model like ours, we should expect employment to
be much more volatile than output. This feature does not arise in standard real business
cycle models because in them the technology shock accounts for much of the movement in
21output.8 (A related problem of sticky price models more generally is that labor productivity
is countercyclical in the model but procyclical in the data.)
In Table 6, we also see that in the model, the cross-country correlation of output is the
same as that of consumption (.49 in both) while in the data, the cross-correlation of output
is higher than that of consumption (.60 vs. .38). While the cross-correlation of consumption
in our model is higher than that in the data, the model does much better on this dimension
than does the standard real business cycle model (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994)). In
the standard real business cycle model, the law of one price holds for all traded goods, and
the real exchange rate does not vary as much as it does in our model. Since an equation like
(14) holds in both models, the lower variability of real exchange rates in the real business
cycle model leads to a higher correlation of the marginal utilities of consumption and, thus,
to a higher cross-country correlation of consumption. A minor discrepancy between the
benchmark model and the data is that in the data, net exports are somewhat countercyclical
(−.41) while in the model they are essentially acyclical (.04).
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Here we examine the sensitivity of our ﬁndings for the benchmark model by varying assump-
tions about four of the benchmark model’s features. We raise the export share of output and
ﬁnd little change. We consider nonseparable preferences and ﬁnd a dramatic reduction in
the volatility of real exchange rates. We add technology and government consumption shocks
and ﬁnd little change. Finally, we model monetary policy as an interest rate rule and with
alternative rules ﬁnd a reduction in the persistence of real exchange rates.
A. High exports
For the benchmark economy, we have chosen parameters so that the export share of output
is 1.6%, which is similar to the share that the United States has in its bilateral trade with
Europe. More open economies have much larger shares than this. To see what diﬀerence a
22larger share might make, we consider a variation of the model with an export share of 15%
instead of 1.6% (by adjusting a1 and a2 accordingly). (See the bottom panel of Table 4.) To
put this value in perspective, note that it is similar to the share that the United States has
with the rest of the world.
In Tables 5 and 6, the columns labeled “High Exports” list the model’s predictions
with the 15% export share. Raising the export share worsens the model’s predictions for net
exports by making this variable more procyclical and by slightly lowering its correlation with
real exchange rates. But raising the export share produces little change overall.
B. Nonseparable preferences
Now we consider what would happen to the benchmark model’s predictions if we make a
change in the form of preferences.
One concern with our benchmark preferences is that balanced growth considerations
impose a very tight restriction between γ, one of the parameters that determine the labor
supply elasticity, and σ, a parameter that determines risk aversion. If these parameters do not
satisfy this restriction, then growth in the model is unbalanced. However, a commonly used
class of preferences yields balanced growth with no such restrictions. A typical speciﬁcation













/(1 − σ). (19)
It is easy to verify that these preferences are consistent with balanced growth.
Unfortunately, they do not generate volatile exchange rates. We determine this by
setting the parameters η, σ, and ω as in the benchmark model, but setting the new parameter
ξ =2 .25, as is typical in the business cycle literature (for example, Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe (1991)). We display the resulting statistics in the columns labeled “Nonseparable
Preferences” in Tables 5 and 6. Now real exchange rates vary hardly at all.
To understand this ﬁnding, recall that the real exchange rate is the ratio of the marginal
utility of consumption in the two countries. In this model, monetary shocks lead to small
changes in the marginal utility of consumption because movements in employment tend to
23oﬀset the eﬀects of movements in consumption. Here an increase in the money growth rate in
the home country increases both consumption and employment in that country. The increase
in consumption decreases the marginal utility of home consumption. With our nonseparable
preferences and σ > 1,U cl > 0, so that the increase in employment increases the marginal
utility of home consumption and, hence, tends to oﬀset the eﬀects of marginal utility arising
from consumption. This oﬀsetting eﬀect does not occur when preferences are separable in
leisure since Ucl =0 .
To get a feel for the magnitude of the oﬀsetting eﬀects from employment, consider the
expression for log-linearized real exchange rates
ˆ q = A(ˆ c − ˆ c
∗)+B(ˆ m − ˆ m
∗)+D(ˆ l − ˆ l
∗), (20)
where the coeﬃcients are A = −cUcc/Uc, B = −mUcm/Uc,a n dD = −lUcl/Uc.I n o u r
quantitative model A =4 .96,B= .04, and D = −3.02. Since B is essentially zero, the
ﬂuctuations in real balances are quantitatively unimportant in determining the variance of




2var(ˆ c − ˆ c∗)
var ˆ y
+ D
2var(ˆ l − ˆ l∗)
var ˆ y
+2 AD
cov(ˆ c − ˆ c∗,ˆ l − ˆ l∗)
var ˆ y
, (21)
(21.16) + (20.98) − (42.24)
where the numbers below the equation are the values of each of the three terms for the
model economy with nonseparable preferences. Here we have used the values for the model’s
statistics given by var(ˆ c − ˆ c∗)/var ˆ y = .86, var(ˆ l − ˆ l∗)/var ˆ y = 2.30, and cov(ˆ c − ˆ c∗,ˆ l − ˆ l∗)/
var ˆ y = 1.41.
The numbers below (21) demonstrate the importance of the covariance between rela-
tive consumption and relative employment in the two countries. Notice that if D were equal
to zero, then the variance of the real exchange relative to output would be simply the ﬁrst
term in (21), and the standard deviation relative to output would be 4.6( ≈ (21.16)1/2).
T h u s ,i fi tw e r en o tf o rt h eo ﬀsetting eﬀects from employment, the model with nonseparable
preferences could easily generate the volatility of exchange rates seen in the data.
24Note that the oﬀsetting eﬀects from employment are higher in the model than in the
data. In the data, var(ˆ c − ˆ c∗)/var ˆ y = .62, var(ˆ l − ˆ l∗)/var ˆ y =. 4 0 ,a n dc o v ( ˆ c − ˆ c∗,ˆ l − ˆ l∗)/
var ˆ y = .37. Substituting these values into (21) and using A =4 .96 and D = −3.02 as above
yields (std ˆ q)/ (std ˆ y) = 2.8. Thus, the main problem with nonseparable preferences is that
the covariance between relative consumption and relative employment is much larger in the
model than in the data (1.41 vs. .37). Of course, if the model could generate the type of
comovements between relative consumption and relative employment in the data, it would
also generate a substantial amount of the variability of real exchange rates in the data.
In our benchmark model, we assume that preferences are separable between consump-
tion and leisure. Thus, D =0 ,t h e r ea r en oo ﬀsetting eﬀects from employment, and the
model can generate the volatility of real exchange rates in the data if A is suﬃciently large,
regardless of the comovements between relative consumption and relative employment. In-
deed, for the benchmark model, cov(ˆ c− ˆ c∗,ˆ l −ˆ l∗)/var ˆ y = 1.33, so that the model misses the
data in terms of this statistic, but with D =0 , that problem does not aﬀect the volatility of
real exchange rates.
C. Real shocks
So far, the only shocks in the model are monetary shocks. Now we add real shocks of two
types: shocks to technology and to government consumption. Here we primarily want to
examine whether adding these shocks improves the model’s performance on business cycle
statistics. As noted above, employment is too volatile in our model because variation in labor
input is the primary source of variation in output at business cycle frequencies. Adding other
shocks will add other sources of variation in output. Unfortunately, this change changes the
model’s predictions little.
We allow for country-speciﬁc technology shocks which are common across all inter-
mediate goods producers. The technology for producing intermediate goods in the home
country and foreign countries is now F(kt,A tlt)a n dF(k∗
t,A ∗
tl∗
t). Here the technology shocks
At and A∗
t are common across all intermediate goods and follow a stochastic process given by
25logAt+1 = ρA logAt+εAt+1 and logA∗
t+1 = ρAlogAt+ε∗
At+1, where the technology innovations
εA and ε∗
A have zero means, are serially uncorrelated, and are uncorrelated with other types




We add government consumption shocks as follows. The ﬁnal good is now used for
government consumption as well as private consumption and investment. The resource con-
straint for the home country is now




w h e r eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tc o n s u m p t i o ngt follows a stochastic process loggt+1 =( 1− ρg)µg +
ρg loggt +εgt+1. To obtain estimates for this autoregressive process, we ran a regression with
data on real government purchases for the United States over the period 1947:1 through
1998:4. Our estimates from this regression are as follows: µg = .13, ρg = .97, and var(εg)=
(.01)2. We assume that the shock εg is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with shocks to
money and technology or to the shock to government consumption in the foreign country.
We model government consumption in the foreign country symmetrically.
In each period, ﬁrst the technology and government consumption shocks occur, then
prices are set, and then the monetary shock occurs. (Alternative timing assumptions lead to
similar results except for the volatility of investment, which increases as we would expect.)
We report the results for this economy in the columns labeled “Real Shocks” in Tables
5 and 6. Again, most of the statistics change little. The main exception is that the relative
volatility of investment increases to be closer to that in the data (from 1.59 in the benchmark
m o d e lt o2 . 3 4i nt h em o d e lw i t hr e a ls h o c k s ) . This change is as we would expect and is
driven by the addition of the technology shocks. More interesting is the relative volatility of
employment, which actually increases slightly (from 1.51 in the benchmark model to 1.56 in
the model with real shocks). To understand this ﬁnding, note that here the log-deviations in









2cov( ˆ A,ˆ l)
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.
26From this expression, we see that introducing technology shocks can increase the variability
of employment if technology shocks and employment are suﬃciently negatively correlated. In
the model, a positive technology shock leads on impact to a fall in employment since ﬁrms can
meet the same demand with fewer workers. This feature of the model makes technology shocks
and employment negatively correlated enough to raise the relative volatility of employment.
Government consumption shocks, meanwhile, have a quantitatively insigniﬁcant role.
D. Taylor rule
Finally, we examine what happens when we change our modeling of monetary policy. There
is a lively debate over the most appropriate way to model monetary policy. A recently
popular way to do so has been with an interest rate rule. Here we discuss how our money
growth rule can be interpreted as an interest rate rule, and we describe the properties of our
model economy under several interest rate rules that stem from the work of Taylor (1993).
Unfortunately, this type of change moves the persistence of real exchange rates in the wrong
direction.
Logically, any interest rate rule can be interpreted as a money growth rule and vice
versa. To see this, posit an interest rate rule and work out the equilibrium of the economy.
This equilibrium has a corresponding money growth process associated with it. Clearly, if this
money growth process is viewed as the policy, then the equilibrium for this economy with this
money growth is the same as that for an economy with the interest rate rule. Of course, if the
economy has multiple equilibria under the interest rule, then each equilibrium has a diﬀerent
money growth process that implements it. The converse also holds. (Of course, such rules can
be represented either as a function of both past endogenous variables and exogenous shocks
or as a function of solely the history of exogenous shocks.) Moreover, empirical evidence
supports our choice for the money growth rule. In particular, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1998) have shown with vector autoregression analysis that a money growth process of
the kind considered here is a good approximation to a process that implements their estimated
interest rate rule.
27As a practical matter, however, some simple interest rate rule might be a better
approximation to the policy reﬂected in the data than is our simple money growth rule.
Thus, we consider the implications of replacing our simple rule for money growth rates with
an interest rate rule similar to the rules studied by Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000).
In particular, we assume that nominal interest rates rt are set as a function of lagged
nominal rates, expected inﬂation rates, and output according to
rt = ρrrt−1 +( 1− ρr)(απEtπt+1 + αy[log gdpt]/4) + εrt, (22)
where we have dropped the constant and converted units to quarterly rates. In (22), πt+1 is
the inﬂation rate from t to t+1,gdpt is real gross domestic product at t, and εrt is a normally
distributed, mean-zero shock. We set ρr = .79, απ =2 .15, and αy = .93/4. (The numbers
are from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000, Table II).) We choose the volatility of the shocks
to match the volatility of output and the correlation of the home shock εrt and the foreign
shock to match the cross-correlation of output.
When we use this Taylor rule in our benchmark model, we are unable to generate
reasonable business cycle behavior. Brieﬂy, for low values of the adjustment cost parameter,
the relative volatility of consumption is tiny. For high values of the adjustment cost parameter,
the relative volatility of consumption increases, but the correlation between consumption and
output is negative.
On closer investigation, we ﬁnd that these features of the model are driven by the non-
separability of consumption and money balances. Since we do not view this nonseparability
as a crucial feature of our model, we try again: we investigate a version of our model with






+ ψ(1 − l)
(1−γ)/(1 − γ).
We set the parameters σ,ψ, and γ as before. (The parameter ω is not relevant since money
demand is determined residually.) In Tables 5 and 6, we report the results for this exercise in
28the columns labeled “Taylor Rule.” This model moves the volatilities of the price ratio and
the exchange rates closer to those in the data. Unfortunately, however, the model’s nominal
and real exchange rates, with autocorrelations of .46 and .48, are much less persistent than
those in either the data or the benchmark model.
We also investigated the properties of the economy that results from a Taylor rule
estimated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Their estimated Taylor rule uses three lags
of nominal interest rates and inﬂation together with current output and two of its lags. When
we use this rule, we obtain essentially the same results as we did with the rule estimated by
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). For example, the autocorrelations of nominal and real
exchange rates are .40 and .43.
Nominal exchange rates are less persistent in our Taylor rule model than in the bench-
mark model because the endogenous policy reaction tends to oﬀset the exogenous shocks. For
example, a negative shock to interest rates in (22) raises the quantity of money and leads to
ar i s ei ni n ﬂation in subsequent periods. This rise in inﬂation leads to an endogenous increase
in interest rates that oﬀsets the initial shock. As a result, interest rates are not very persis-
tent and, hence, neither are movements in consumption or real exchange rates. We conﬁrmed
this intuition by analyzing the properties of the model for higher values of ρr. For example,
when we raised ρr from .79 to .95, the autocorrelations of nominal and real exchange rates
increased from .46 and .48 to .63 and .60, while for ρr = .99, these autocorrelations increased
even further, to .64 and .63.
6. ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE TWO ANOMALIES
Now we make some changes in the benchmark model to try to eliminate, or at least shrink,
the two anomalies we have discovered between the model and the data. Unfortunately, we
don’t manage to aﬀect either anomaly much.
29A. The persistence anomaly
Recall that our benchmark model generates somewhat less persistence in real exchange rates
than is present in the data. We attempt to eliminate this persistence anomaly by pursuing
an avenue for increasing persistence that seems promising: adding labor frictions by making
wages sticky. However, this change leads to only a marginal improvement in the benchmark
model’s persistence performance.
Our logic for using sticky wages to increase persistence is as follows. In the benchmark
model, wages immediately rise after a monetary shock. This rise in wages leads intermediate
goods producers to increase their prices as soon as they can. Thus, the benchmark model
generates little endogenous price-stickiness, that is, price-stickiness beyond that exogenously
imposed. Preset nominal wages cannot rise after a monetary shock. If they do not, inter-
mediate goods producers may choose not to raise prices much when they can. Hence, the
model may lead to some endogenous price-stickiness and, consequently, more persistence in
exchange rates.
We extend the benchmark model to include sticky wages by letting labor be diﬀerenti-
ated and introducing monopolistically competitive unions that set wages in a staggered way
for M periods.
The ﬁnal goods producers in the model remain as before, while the problems of the
intermediate goods producers and the consumers are altered. The only change in technology
is that the labor input l(i,st) of intermediate goods producer i is now a composite of a









where l(i,j,st) denotes the amount of diﬀerentiated labor input j used by intermediate goods
producer i in period t and ϑ is the parameter determining the substitutability across diﬀerent
types of labor.
The problem of the intermediate goods producers is the same as before except that
now they have a subproblem of determining the cost-minimizing composition of the diﬀerent










subject to (23), where W(j,st−1) is the nominal wage for the jth type of labor in period t
and where the dependence of this wage on st−1 reﬂects our timing assumption on the setting
of wages discussed below. The solution to this problem is the demand for labor of type j by















ϑ is the nominal wage index. Substitution of the de-
mand for labor l(i,j,st) into (24) implies that the real wage index is given by w(st)=
¯ W(st)/P(st).
The consumer side of the labor market can be thought of as being organized into a
continuum of unions indexed by j. Each union consists of all the consumers in the economy
with labor of type j. Each union realizes that it faces a downward-sloping demand for its
type of labor. The total demand for labor of type j is obtained by integrating across the










We assume that a fraction 1/M of unions set their wages in a given period and hold
wages ﬁxed for M subsequent periods. The unions are indexed so that those with j ∈ [0,1/M]
set new wages in 0, M,2 M, and so on, while those with j ∈ [1/M, 2/M] set new wages in
1, M +1 ,2 M + 1, and so on, for the M cohorts of unions. In each period, these new wages
are set before the realization of the current monetary shocks. Notice that the wage-setting
arrangement is analogous to the price-setting arrangement for intermediate goods producers.























and the constraints that wages are set for M periods, W(j,st−1)=W(j,s−1)f o rt =
0,...,M− 1, and W(j,st−1)=W(j,sM−1)f o rt = M, ..., 2M − 1, and so on. We choose
the initial bond holdings B of the unions so that each union has the same present discounted
value of income.
In this problem, the union chooses the wage and agrees to supply whatever labor is
demanded at that wage. The ﬁrst-order conditions are changed from those in the benchmark
economy as follows. The condition for the consumer’s labor choice (10) is replaced by the













Notice that in a steady state, this condition reduces to W/P =( 1 /ϑ)(−Ul/Uc), so that
real wages are set as a markup over the marginal rate of substitution between labor and
consumption. The conditions (11) and (12) are now indexed by j. These conditions, together
with our assumption on initial bond holdings, imply that Uc(j,st)a n dUm(j,st)a r ee q u a t e d
across unions.
The new parameters in the model are the number of periods of wage-setting M and
the markup parameter ϑ. Following Taylor’s (1999) discussion of the evidence, we set M =4 .
We set ϑ = .87 so that the markup is about 15%. This markup is consistent with estimates
of the markup of union wages over nonunion wages. (See Lewis (1986).)
The results of this adjusted model are in Tables 5 and 6, in the columns labeled “Sticky
Wages.” There we see that the sticky wage model improves on the benchmark model only
slightly. The sticky wage model decreases the volatility of the price ratio a bit (from 3.00 to
2.11) and increases the volatility of real exchange rates enough to make it match the data
(from 4.27 to 4.35). The sticky wage model also slightly increases the persistence of real
exchange rates (from .62 to .69) and the cross-correlation of real and nominal exchange rates
32(from .76 to .88). The business cycle statistics remain basically unchanged, except for the
cross-correlations of real exchange rates with GDP and net exports with GDP, which worsen
slightly.
B. The consumption—real exchange rate anomaly
Now we turn to the consumption—real exchange rate anomaly, which, recall, is that the model
generates a much higher correlation between these two variables than is seen in the data. To
attempt to eliminate this anomaly, we try two ways of changing the model. First we restrict
the set of assets that can be traded across countries, thereby making markets incomplete.
This avenue weakens the link between real exchange rates and relative consumption. Then
we allow for habit persistence in preferences. We ﬁnd that neither avenue is successful in
eliminating the consumption—real exchange rate anomaly.
With incomplete markets, the simple static relationship between the real exchange
rate and the ratio of the marginal utilities given in (18) is replaced by a relationship that
holds only in expected ﬁrst diﬀerences. Furthermore, with incomplete markets, monetary
shocks can lead to wealth redistributions across countries and can increase the persistence of
real exchange rates.
We introduce market incompleteness into the benchmark model by replacing the com-
plete set of contingent bonds traded across countries by a single uncontingent nominal bond.





where D is the consumer’s bond holdings. The real value of these bonds D(st)/P(st)i s
bounded below. Here each unit of D(st) is a claim on one unit of the home currency in
all states st+1 that can occur at t +1 , and ¯ Q(st) is the corresponding price. The foreign
consumer’s budget constraint is modiﬁed similarly.






























Equating (30) and (31) and log-linearizing the resulting equation gives
Et
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where carets denote log-deviations from a steady state with D =0 . Noting that ˆ qt =ˆ et +
ˆ P∗
t − ˆ Pt, we can rewrite (32) as




ct+1 − ˆ Uct+1) − (ˆ U
∗
ct − ˆ Uct)
i
. (33)
Thus, with incomplete markets, the relation between real exchange rates and marginal utilities
only holds in expected ﬁrst diﬀerences, rather than as it did in (14) with complete markets.
In Tables 5 and 6, we report statistics for an incomplete market economy which has the
same parameters as does the benchmark economy, but has the asset structure just discussed.
In the columns labeled “Incomplete Markets,” the statistics in both tables are virtually
identical to those for the benchmark economy with complete markets. Thus, while adding
incomplete markets theoretically could help eliminate the consumption—real exchange rate
anomaly, quantitatively it does not.
So we try something else. In our benchmark model, the tight link between real ex-
change rates and marginal utilities arises because of consumers’ abilities to trade in asset
markets. This observation suggests that the consumption—real exchange rate anomaly might
be reduced by adding speciﬁcations of utility functions used to analyze other asset market
anomalies. One such speciﬁcation has external habit persistence, in that lagged aggregate
consumption enters each household’s period utility function.
34In our context, we can add habit persistence by replacing c in (15) with ct − d¯ ct−1,
where ¯ ct−1 is lagged aggregate consumption and d is the habit persistence parameter. With






[(ˆ ct − ˆ c
∗
t) − d(ˆ ct−1 − ˆ c
∗
t−1)] + B(ˆ m − ˆ m
∗), (34)
where A = −cUcc/Uc and B = −mUcm/Uc. In what follows, we set B to 0 since it is small.
We can use the data to see whether the habit persistence approach is promising. Using
H-P—ﬁltered data for the United States and Europe, we compute the correlation between real
exchange rates and the right side of (34). We experimented with values for d between −1
and 1 and found that this correlation attains its maximum value of −.19 at d arbitrarily close
to 1. If the theory is correct, then this correlation will be 1. We conclude that this popular
version of the habit persistence approach is not particularly promising.
Since none of our models can produce the negative correlation between real exchange
rates and relative consumption in U.S.-European data, we ask whether this negative corre-
lation is pervasive across diﬀerent sets of countries. In Table 7, we report the correlation
between bilateral real exchange rates and bilateral relative consumption for ﬁve countries
(France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States). This correlation
varies between −.48 and .24, which suggests that there is no tight link in the data. Clearly,
we need models with asset market frictions to break the tight link between real exchange
rates and marginal utilities and thus between real exchange rates and relative consumption.
7. CONCLUSION
The central puzzle in international business cycles is that ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates
are volatile and persistent. Here we have taken a step toward solving that puzzle. We
have developed a general equilibrium, sticky price model which can generate real exchange
rates that are appropriately volatile and quite persistent, though not quite persistent enough.
We have found that for monetary shocks to generate these data, the model needs to have
preferences separable in leisure, high risk aversion, and price-stickiness of at least one year. We
35have also found that if monetary shocks are correlated across countries, then the comovements
in aggregates across countries in the model are broadly consistent with those in the data.
We have seen that without substantial price-stickiness, real exchange rates are not
persistent. We have assumed that prices are exogenously ﬁxed for one year. While this
assumption generates movements in prices that are consistent with the evidence of Taylor
(1999), simply assuming that ﬁrms cannot change their prices for a year is somewhat un-
appealing. A major challenge in this line of research is to ﬁnd a mechanism that generates
substantial amounts of endogenous price-stickiness from small frictions. By this, we mean a
mechanism that leads ﬁrms to optimally choose not to change prices much even when they
can freely do so.
The main failing of our model is the consumption—real exchange rate anomaly: the
model predicts a high correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption
across countries while none exists in the data. We have shown that complete asset markets
have a tight link between the real exchange rate and relative consumption which generates
the anomaly. In particular, such frictions as sticky prices, sticky wages, and trading frictions
in goods markets play no role in breaking this link. We have also shown that the most widely
used forms of asset market incompleteness and habit persistence do not eliminate–or even
shrink–the anomaly.
Essentially all of the models in the international business cycle literature, real and
nominal, have either complete markets or the type of incomplete markets considered here.
Our analysis suggests that all of these models will display the consumption—real exchange
rate anomaly. To attempt to eliminate it, future research should focus on incorporating richer
forms of asset market frictions.
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1In particular, our constructed index is et =
P
i∈I ωieit/ei0, where eit is the exchange
rate for country i in period t, ei0 is the exchange rate for country i in the ﬁrst quarter of
1973, and the weight ωi is the time series average of the ratio of the dollar value of exports
plus imports between country i and the United States to the total dollar value of all exports
plus imports between the European countries included in set I and the United States. The
countries (and their trade weights) included in our data set are Austria (1.2), Denmark (1.8),
Finland (1.2), France (13.8), Germany (25.7), Italy (11.6), the Netherlands (10.5), Norway
(2.2), Spain (2.7), Switzerland (5.8), and the United Kingdom (23.5).
2Our real exchange rate measure is substantially more volatile than another measure
of the real exchange rate between the United States and the rest of the world. The IMF, in
its International Financial Statistics, reports the eﬀective real exchange rate for the United
States, based on weights derived from the multilateral exchange rate model (MERM). For
the period 1980:1—2000:1, this exchange rate has a standard deviation of 4.63 and an auto-
correlation of .82. The MERM measure is less volatile than the measure we use presumably
because shocks aﬀecting bilateral exchange rates are not perfectly correlated across countries,
and the MERM measure averages across more countries than our measure does.
3In this discussion, we ignore a third source of real exchange rate ﬂuctuations. When
there are multiple traded goods and consumption baskets diﬀer across countries, ﬂuctuations
in the relative prices of traded goods can induce ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates. In our
data, this source is minor because European and U.S. consumption baskets are similar. This
source is present in our theoretical model and turns out to be relatively small there as well.
4To derive our benchmark model’s implications for growth paths, we suppress uncer-
tainty and add equal rates of productivity growth to both the market and nonmarket sectors.
Suppose that in the market sector, the technology for each intermediate goods producer is
given by F(kt,z tlt), where zt grows at a constant rate z. And in the spirit of Becker (1993),
suppose that in the nonmarket sector, technical progress raises the productivity of time al-
located to nonmarket activities, so that an input of 1 − lt units of time outside the market
produces zt(1 − lt) units of leisure services. With our benchmark preferences, if ct and mt





(1+z)−σt , where κ is a constant. Along a balanced growth path, wages grow at the same
rate as zt, so in order to have a balanced growth path, the economy must have σ = γ.
5Our series for the foreign country are aggregates for France, Germany, Italy, and the
United Kingdom obtained from the OECD. Our choices of countries and time period are
37dictated by data availability. We convert these series into dollars using the OECD’s 1990
purchasing power parity exchange rate and add the results to obtain our aggregates for
Europe.
6If we keep the adjustment cost parameter unchanged, then as we increase σ, the relative
volatility of consumption and output decreases somewhat. Hence, the volatility of the real
exchange rate increases with σ, but at a somewhat slower rate. For example, with b held
ﬁxed, the volatilities of the real exchange rate at σ =1 .01 and 10 are 1.21 and 6.39, while
with b adjusted, these volatilities are .87 and 8.75.
7Note that, across countries, there is greater heterogeneity in the correlations be-
tween real exchange rates and various aggregates–like output, net exports, and relative
consumption–than for other statistics–like the volatility and persistence of real exchange
rates or the cross-correlation of real and nominal exchange rates.
8One extension that might help sticky price models in this dimension is to have cyclical
variations in the intensity that measured capital and labor are worked.
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42Table 1
Properties of exchange rates and consumer price indices∗
Country Relative to U.S. Europe
Relative
Statistic Austria Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Spain Switzerland U.K. to U.S.
Standard Deviations
Price ratio 1.59 1.23 1.80 1.17 1.42 1.67 1.62 1.80 2.29 1.49 1.74 1.18
Exchange rate
N o m i n a l 8 . 1 98 . 0 88 . 2 88 . 5 28 . 3 78 . 5 18 . 3 06 . 2 38 . 8 89 . 0 88 . 2 0 7 . 9 5
Real 7.93 8.00 7.71 7.95 8.06 7.80 7.99 6.08 8.42 8.83 7.89 7.52
Autocorrelations
Price ratio .89 .74 .92 .92 .90 .87 .93 .90 .90 .90 .79 .90
Exchange rate
N o m i n a l . 8 3. 8 4. 8 5. 8 6. 8 3. 8 5. 8 4. 7 8. 8 7. 8 2. 8 4 . 8 5
R e a l . 8 2. 8 3. 8 3. 8 4. 8 2. 8 3. 8 2. 7 7. 8 6. 8 2. 8 1 . 8 3
Cross-Correlations
Real and nominal exchange rates .98 .99 .98 .99 .99 .98 .98 .96 .97 .99 .98 .99
∗ See notes at the end of the tables.Table 2
Properties of exchange rates and disaggregated consumer price indices∗
Country Relative to U.S. Europe
Relative
Statistic France Italy Netherlands Norway to U.S.
Standard Deviations
Price ratio
All goods 1.01 1.57 1.44 1.82 1.24
Traded goods 1.42 2.00 1.97 2.13 1.65
Exchange rate
Nominal 8.72 8.68 8.50 6.39 8.25
All goods real 8.25 8.10 8.24 6.14 7.78
Traded goods real 8.05 8.12 8.05 6.34 7.76
Autocorrelations
Price ratio
All goods .90 .83 .88 .91 .91
Traded goods .90 .85 .84 .90 .89
Exchange rate
Nominal .86 .86 .84 .79 .85
All goods real .84 .83 .83 .76 .83
Traded goods real .84 .83 .82 .79 .83
Cross-Correlations of Exchange Rates
Real and nominal
All goods .99 .98 .99 .96 .99
Traded goods .99 .97 .97 .94 .94
All and traded goods real 1.00 .99 .99 .99 1.00
∗ See notes at the end of the tables.Table 3
Properties of exchange rates and wholesale price indices∗
Country Relative to U.S. Europe
Relative
Statistic Austria Denmark Finland Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland U.K. to U.S.
Standard Deviations
Price ratio 2.19 2.25 1.92 2.04 2.86 2.59 2.85 1.99 2.52 2.08
Exchange rate
Nominal 8.19 8.08 8.28 8.37 8.51 8.30 8.88 9.08 8.20 7.98
Real 7.45 6.52 7.29 7.74 7.35 7.59 7.79 8.71 7.25 7.30
Autocorrelations
Price ratio .76 .86 .83 .88 .83 .90 .87 .85 .85 .87
Exchange rate
Nominal .83 .84 .85 .83 .85 .84 .87 .82 .84 .85
R e a l . 7 9. 8 0. 8 2. 8 1. 8 2. 8 2. 8 4. 8 0. 7 9 . 8 2
Cross-Correlations
Real and nominal exchange rates .97 .97 .98 .97 .95 .95 .95 .98 .95 .97
∗ See notes at the end of the tables.Table 4
Parameter values∗
Benchmark Model
Preferences β = .99, ψ =1 0 ,γ =5 ,σ =5 ,η = .39, ω = .94
Final goods technology ρ =1 /3, a1 = .94, a2 = .06
Intermediate goods technology α =1 /3, δ = .021, θ = .9, N =4
Money growth process ρµ = .68, corr(εµ,ε∗
µ)=.5
Variationsa
High exports a1 = .76, a2 = .24
Nonseparable preferences ξ =2 .25
Real shocks
Technology ρA = .95, var(εA)=v a r ( ε∗
A)=( .007)2,c o r r ( εA,ε∗
A)=.25
Government consumption µg = .13, ρg = .97, var(εg)=v a r ( ε∗
g)=( .01)2
Taylor rule ρr = .79, απ =2 .15, αy = .93/4, corr(εr,ε∗
r)=.5
Sticky wages ϑ = .87, M =4
Incomplete markets Same as benchmark model
∗ See notes at the end of the tables.Table 5
Exchange rates and prices for the models∗
Variations on the Benchmark Economya
Benchmark High Nonseparable Real Taylor Sticky Incomplete
Statistic Datab Economy Exports Preferences Shocks Rule Wages Markets
Standard Deviations Relative to GDPc
Price ratio .71 3.00 3.26 .02 2.98 1.35 2.11 2.98
(.75) (.77) (.00) (.74) (.33) (.59) (.75)
Exchange rate
Nominal 4.67 4.32 4.27 .07 4.27 4.66 4.14 4.22
(.80) (.79) (.01) (.80) (.66) (.80) (.78)
Real 4.36 4.27 4.09 .05 4.26 4.98 4.35 4.19
(.72) (.67) (.01) (.71) (.72) (.83) (.71)
Autocorrelations
Price ratio .87 .93 .92 .81 .93 .92 .95 .93
(.02) (.02) (.06) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Exchange rate
Nominal .86 .69 .69 .83 .69 .46 .69 .69
(.08) (.08) (.05) (.08) (.10) (.08) (.08)
Real .83 .62 .58 .77 .62 .48 .69 .62
(.08) (.08) (.06) (.08) (.09) (.08) (.08)
Cross-Correlations
Real and nominal exchange rates .99 .76 .70 .98 .76 .96 .88 .75
(.06) (.07) (.00) (.06) (.01) (.04) (.06)
∗ See notes at the end of the tables.Table 6
Business cycle statistics for the models∗
Variations on the Benchmark Economy
Benchmark High Nonseparable Real Taylor Sticky Incomplete
Statistic Dataa Economy Exports Preferences Shocks Rule Wages Markets
Standard Deviations Relative to GDP
Consumption .83 .83 .83 .92 .83 .83 .83 .83
(.01) (.04) (.00) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Investment 2.78 1.59 1.70 1.32 2.34 1.62 1.49 1.59
(.01) (.08) (.01) (.05) (.01) (.03) (.01)
Employment .67 1.51 1.49 1.51 1.56 1.51 1.50 1.50
(.01) (.03) (.00) (.09) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Net exports .11 .09 .69 .04 .11 .09 .19 .09
(.01) (.08) (.00) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01)
Autocorrelations
GDP .88 .62 .65 .03 .61 .49 .70 .62
(.08) (.07) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.08)
Consumption .89 .61 .60 .03 .61 .48 .67 .61
(.08) (.08) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.08)
Investment .91 .60 .59 .03 .60 .47 .68 .60
(.08) (.08) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.08)
Employment .90 .61 .63 .03 .61 .48 .69 .61
(.08) (.07) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.08)
Net exports .82 .72 .53 .12 .77 .68 .84 .71
(.05) (.07) (.11) (.05) (.06) (.04) (.05)
Cross-Correlations
Between foreign and domestic
GDP .60 .49 .58 .50 .47 .51 .43 .49
(.14) (.14) (.09) (.14) (.12) (.18) (.14)
Consumption .38 .49 .52 .50 .48 .50 .49 .49
(.14) (.13) (.09) (.14) (.12) (.16) (.14)
Investment .33 .49 .52 .41 .48 .50 .48 .49
(.14) (.13) (.10) (.14) (.12) (.16) (.14)
Employment .39 .49 .60 .50 .48 .51 .44 .49
(.14) (.13) (.09) (.14) (.12) (.18) (.14)
Between net exports and GDP −.41 .04 .11 −.50 .05 −.04 .26 .04
(.16) (.15) (.09) (.17) (.15) (.18) (.16)
Between real exchange rates and
GDP .08 .51 .34 .17 .51 .49 .52 .51
(.13) (.15) (.09) (.13) (.11) (.15) (.13)
Net exports .14 −.04 −.47 −.26 .03 −.20 .30 −.04
(.13) (.09) (.06) (.16) (.13) (.13) (.13)
Relative consumption −.35 1.00 1.00 .32 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(.00) (.00) (.04) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
∗ See notes at the end of the tables.Table 7
The correlation between real exchange rates and relative consumption
among ﬁve countries during 1973:1—1994:4∗
France Germany Italy U.K.
U.S. −.06 −.15 −.35 −.48
France .24 −.17 .05
Germany −.08 .17
Italy .14
∗ See notes at the end of the tables.Footnotes to the Tables
Table 1.
∗ T h es t a t i s t i c sa r eb a s e do nl o g g e da n dH - P — ﬁltered quarterly data for the period 1973:1—2000:1. The statistics for Europe are trade-weighted
aggregates of countries in the table. (See the text for details on construction of the data for Europe.)
Table 2.
∗ T h es t a t i s t i c sa r eb a s e do nl o g g e da n dH - P — ﬁltered quarterly data for the period 1973:1—1998:4. The statistics for Europe are trade-weighted
aggregates of countries in the table. (See the text for details.)
Table 3.
∗ T h es t a t i s t i c sa r eb a s e do nl o g g e da n dH - P — ﬁltered quarterly data for the period 1973:1—2000:1. The statistics for Europe are trade-weighted
aggregates of countries in the table. (See the text for details.)
Table 4.
a Other parameters in the variations are the same as in the benchmark model, except for two parameters. The adjustment cost parameter is
chosen to keep the relative volatility of consumption and output the same as in the data. The innovations to the monetary policy are chosen to
keep the volatility of output the same as in the data.
Table 5.
∗ T h es t a t i s t i c sa r eb a s e do nl o g g e da n dH - P — ﬁltered data. For each economy the standard deviation of monetary shocks are chosen so that the
standard deviation of GDP is the same as it is in the data for 1973:1—1994:4, 1.82%. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the
statistic across 100 simulations.
a See Table 4 for speciﬁcations of the variations of the benchmark economy.
b The statistics are based on a European aggregate with France, Italy, the U.K., and Germany over the sample period 1973:1—1994:4.
c The standard deviations of the variables are divided by the standard deviation of GDP.
Table 6.
∗ Notes a and c of Table 5 also apply here. With the exception of net exports, the standard deviation of each variable is divided by the standard
deviation of output. Throughout the table, we measure net exports as the H-P—ﬁltered ratio of real net exports to real gross domestic product.
Thus, the standard deviation of net exports is simply the standard deviation of this ratio.
a With the exception of net exports, the standard deviations and autocorrelations in the data column are based on logged and H-P—ﬁltered
U.S. quarterly data for the period 1973:1—1994:4. The cross-correlations between domestic and foreign variables are based on the U.S. and a
European aggregate of France, Italy, the U.K., and Germany.
Table 7.
∗ The table reports the correlation between bilateral real exchange rates ˆ qt and relative consumption ˆ ct − ˆ c∗
t.Sources of basic data: IMF and OECD
NOTE: The real exchange rate is , where the nominal exchange rate
is the U.S. dollar price of a basket of European currencies,
is an aggregate of European CPIs, and is the U.S. CPI.











































Exchange rates and the price ratio
between the United States and Europe





































A decomposition of real exchange rates




























































The benchmark model’s real exchange rate properties
vs. Its curvature parameter












































Measures of persistence vs. Price-stickiness
Figure 4
Volatility of Price Ratio
Relative to Output
(right scale)
Autocorrelation of
Nominal Exchange Rate
Autocorrelation of
Consumption
N